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The purpose of this paper is to study the impact caused by the Tohoku 2011 
earthquake, within the energy sector across the World. In order to measure 
results, a couple of methodologies that resorted to abnormal returns were 
undertaken and multiple significance tests were made to verify statistical 
relevancy on the findings. It has been possible to observe a positive reaction on 
the “Nuclear Energy” companies, as well as a negative impact on the “Renewable 
Energy” group, with the most prominent results coming from the second 
methodology. However, due to the lack of statistical significance across most of 
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The unpredictability of events that are capable of generating a huge impact in 
the world’s economy makes them extremely valuable to be analyzed 
thoroughly, especially from an academic standing point. The 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake that hit Japan roughly two years ago fits perfectly into the type of 
events worthy of being studied, as it provides a precious opportunity to 
observe how the stock markets react from different kind of scopes, may those 
be from a sectoral level or from a country-by-country perspective. 
The way such a major event as a devastating natural disaster catches everyone 
by surprise, allows for the possibility of assuming the markets couldn’t be 
reflecting in any way what was about to happen, which is firmly a key point for 
the basis of the study being undertaken. The more unexpected the events are, 
the bigger the reactions in the stock markets are also expected to be, as long of 
course that the event itself leads to serious consequences in the way the 
economy operates, which has been the case of the Tohoku earthquake. 
Another key point that is implicit in this work has to do with the extent to 
which the global awareness for a known problem can change drastically. The 
dangers of resorting to nuclear power are surely long known, but determining 
the impact that an earthquake occurred in Japan produces across borders, gives 
a rare opportunity to measure how the global perception on potential 
problematic energy sources can actually change in a short matter of time. The 
nuclear disaster was confined to the Japanese geographical area, but its 
economical and financial effects are expected to be felt worldwide due to the 
magnitude of the event, mostly within the energy sector. 
This study aims at trying to assess if the earthquake and its whole series of 
events that led to the nuclear accidents in the region of Tohoku, actually ended 
up having any significant impact within the energy sector, not only in Japan, 
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but also in several other countries where a reasonable amount of energy 
companies are listed on stock markets. This will be done through the 
computation of multiple tests for different purposes and levels of analysis, from 
which the abnormal returns observations will allow the measurement of the 
impact, followed by their respective statistical tests, whenever it’s suitable for 
the case in question. 
Aside of a dedicated timeline analysis, Japan will always deserve a closer look 
throughout this study, not only because it has literally been the epicenter of the 
earthquake event, but also due to the fact that its own energy market will be 




II. The Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 
2.1. Understanding the trigger event 
On March 11 of 2011, an unpredicted earthquake and tsunami struck the 
Japanese northeastern coast, causing massive damage and destruction, mainly 
at the Tohoku region. The earthquake occurred at 2:46 PM local time (GMT+9) 
and was measured at 9.0 on the Richter scale. The magnitude of this natural 
disaster has been overwhelming and besides the obvious infrastructure 
damages, the official death toll announced went beyond the 20,000 bodies. 
When such a surprising event takes place, the economical and social 
consequences are typically very hard to predict. Having this in mind, the 
precise moment when the earthquake occurred represents a good opportunity 
to start measuring several dimensions of the impact, particularly across the 
financial markets. Unlike several other similar past studies conducted on 
subjects related to the “information transfers” theme (Firth, 1976; Bowen, 
Castanias and Daley, 1983; Schipper, 1990), a trigger event coming from an 
unexpected earthquake and tsunami fits perfectly into the need of being sure 
that the markets weren’t granted with the chance to previously react and get 
prepared for such a catalyst event.  
The fact that the earthquake occurred on a Friday, roughly 15 minutes before 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange closing time (3:00 PM), led to a very small reaction 
within the Japanese stock markets that day, mostly due to the small window of 
time. Moreover, there has never been a very accurate awareness of the 
consequences and dangers triggered by this Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 
within the first days. The timeline presented in the next chapter can actually 
help understanding the long sequence of events, but is also a good proof of how 
the information unfolded very slowly, over several days. As one can see on 
Table 1, several markets were still open more than 6 hours after the disaster, but 
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even in those circumstances, the effects haven’t been felt in a very visible way 
on that first day (Friday, 11th of March 2011). 
Table 1 – Stock indexes closing time 
Stock index name Country Earthquake time* Closing time* Window time** 
Tokyo Stock Exchange JP 2:46 PM 3:00 PM +14m 
Shangai SE A CN 1:46 PM 3:00 PM +1h,14m 
DAX30 Performance DE 7:46 AM 5:30 PM +7h,14m 
Russian MICEX RU 9:46 AM 6:45 PM +8h,59m 
FTSE100 UK 6:46 AM 4:30 PM +9h,44m 
Brazil Bovespa BR 2:46 AM 5:00 PM +14h,14m 
NASDAQ US 1:46 AM 4:00 PM +14h,14m 
NYSE US 1:46 AM 4:00 PM +14h,14m 
*Local time 




2.2. Timeline analysis 
In order to better understand the sequence of events caused by the Tohoku 
earthquake that occurred on the 11th of March of 2011, the following timeline 
has been built on a day-by-day basis. Most of the data and economical 
information was gathered from a reinsurance company public report (Aon 
Benfield, 2011), and an online timeline construction made for the days following 
the event (http://gizmodo.com/5780998/the-definitive-japan-crisis-timeline), 
lastly updated on May 12, 2011. 
Friday (11-03-2011): Roughly at 14:46 (Japanese Standard Time; GMT+9), a 
strong undersea earthquake hit Japan’s north-eastern coast. The quake’s 
magnitude was recorded at 9.0 on the Richter scale, making it the fifth largest 
earthquake to have ever been measured. Following the first temblor, several 
aftershocks took place and still with a magnitude exceeding 7.0. As an almost 
immediate reaction to the disaster, the Japanese authorities ordered four 
nuclear power stations to close down, in order to prevent more serious 
consequences. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (owned by the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company) was by far the most affected nuclear infra-
structure and later that day, all their cooling systems stopped working 
properly, forcing the Japanese government to issue a first emergency alert. 
Saturday (12-03-2011): After the growing awareness of how serious the nuclear 
risk actually was, the Japanese authorities decided to order the evacuation of 
residents near one of the Fukushima nuclear power plants and started doing 
examinations for contamination. During the afternoon, a first explosion 
occurred inside one of the reactors and reports of a radioactive leak started 
coming out. The United States responded quickly and started sending some 




Sunday (13-03-2011): A few cases of positive contamination for radiation 
exposure in Fukushima were confirmed. The Japanese government announced 
that roughly 200,000 people were evacuated from the critical area surrounding 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. With the goal of minimizing the 
effects of the lack of power supply, the Japanese authorities started rationing 
energy, in a stage where some of the most affected areas were already deprived 
of water and energy. 
Monday (14-03-2011): The Tokyo Stock Exchange reopened with a predictable 
drop, ending the day with a fall of -7.49% in the shares price. A second 
explosion blasted at the Fukushima power plant, destroying the outer building 
of one of the nuclear reactors and increasing concerns for more serious 
consequences. Several attempts kept being made to cool down the containment 
vessels, including pumping sea water. In order to avoid a collapse of the 
financial system, Japan’s central bank injected a record 15 trillion yen into the 
market. 
Tuesday (15-03-2011): Two more explosions occurred in the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant and a fire broke out in the spent fuel pond inside one of the 
reactors. The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) reported that the fire 
had released radioactivity directly into the atmosphere. In the meanwhile, 
radiation levels surpassed the legal limit, forcing the evacuation of a significant 
amount of workers. Following the previous days’ efforts to ease the economic 
impact of such a serious natural disaster, the Bank of Japan announced another 
8 trillion yen injection to the financial system. The Tokyo Stock Exchange ended 
the day with another huge drop, with shares prices losing around -9.47%. 
Wednesday (16-03-2011): A new fire broke loose, once again in one of the 
reactors from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. As a direct result 
from this, white radioactive smoke rose from the nuclear complex, floating into 
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the atmosphere. For the third day in a row, the Bank of Japan pumped another 
3.5 trillion yen into the financial system and the Tokyo Stock Exchange finally 
showed signs of an expressive rebound, ending the day with a rise of 6.64% in 
the shares price. On the field, fears of a nuclear vessel breached and a massive 
radiation release into the atmosphere extended the high level of 
unpredictability for the upcoming days. 
Thursday (17-03-2011): The Bank of Japan injected another 6 million yen into 
the financial markets, as they reinforced their strategy of assuring liquidity in 
the Japanese short-term money market. After the European Union and the 
French Nuclear Agency gave voice to their concerns about the real menace 
coming from the high radiation levels, the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commissioner, Gregory Jackzo, revealed his fears that the radiation present in 
the atmosphere could actually be very close to reach lethal levels. 
Friday (18-03-2011): For the fifth day in a row, the Bank of Japan continued to 
inject funds into the financial system, this time with a 3 million yen transfer. 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange closed with a positive reaction, with shares prices 
moving up by 2.42%. In the meanwhile, one of the most troubled Fukushima 
nuclear reactors got connected to an external power grid, which eased the task 
for the cooling system and residual heat removal. Close to the end of the day, 
the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) announced that they had 
raised the Tohoku nuclear event alert level to 5. 
Reactions across several of the main stock indexes in the World, for the day of 






Table 2 – Stock indexes reaction to the Tohoku nuclear disaster 
Stock index name Country Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 
Brazil Bovespa BR 0.98% 0.73% -0.24% -1.50% 0.32% 1.00% 
Shangai SE A CN -0.79% 0.13% -1.41% 1.20% -1.14% 0.33% 
DAX30 Performance DE -1.16% -1.65% -3.19% -2.01% 2.20% 0.11% 
Tokyo Stock Exchange JP -1.65% -7.49% -9.47% 6.64% -0.84% 2.42% 
Russian MICEX RU -0.68% 0.40% -1.52% 0.27% 1.90% 0.56% 
FTSE100 UK -0.28% -0.92% -1.38% -1.70% 1.75% 0.39% 
NASDAQ US 0.54% -0.54% -1.25% -1.89% 0.73% 0.29% 
NYSE US 0.59% -0.66% -1.24% -2.00% 1.70% 0.64% 
S&P 500 US 0.71% -0.60% -1.12% -1.95% 1.34% 0.43% 
*Day 0: 11-03-2011; Day 1: 14-03-2011; Day 2: 15-03-2011; Day 3: 16-03-2011; Day 4: 17-03-2011; Day 5: 18-03-2011 
As one would expect, the Japanese Tokyo Stock Exchange was by far the most 
affected stock market from the list, especially in those 3 working days time 
span, from “Day 0” (March 11) to “Day 2” (March 15). As it had been reported 
previously on Table 1, the small time-window available at the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange on the very same day of the event (14 minutes), somehow delayed the 
biggest reaction for the following Monday and Tuesday, precisely the period 
where the stock prices started plunging dramatically. 
The effects on the remaining stock indexes as a whole don’t show off any 
particularly striking trend for the period under study, but a closer look will be 




III. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample 
The main sample consists in a list of companies involved in the energy sector 
and picked from a worldwide spectrum. In order to deal with data which could 
be analyzed further on, all these companies were confined to a criteria that 
demanded for stocks to be priced in regulated markets. The sample period goes 
from January 2009 until September 2011 and the focus will be set in studying 
the stock market effects produced by what has necessarily to be seen as an 
always unpredictable earthquake, occurred in Tohoku (Japan), on March 11, 
2011. 
All the data was gathered from Datastream, which allowed to filter the initial 
sample by industry groups, all related to energy activities. From that point 
onwards, another Datastream field information concerning a specific text 
description of all companies’ activities was used, in order to proceed with a 
more accurate identification that would allow to properly fit them into the 3 
main categories: 
- Nuclear energy companies (direct and indirect producers)  
- Renewable energy companies 
- Energy companies in general 
Countries which had less than 10 companies have been purged from the 
sample, not only to allow the computed market returns to be more statistically 
relevant (specifically for the formula used on chapter 4.1), but also to help 
filtering countries that have strong regulated markets. 
The final sample consists of 451 firms, belonging to 15 different countries and 
grouped by the 3 main categories that were referred above. This sample 
comprises 39 companies from the nuclear energy sector, 119 from the renewable 
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energy sector and 293 energy companies in general. The following tables 
(Tables 3 and 4) summarize how the sample is grouped by countries and 
categories. 
 
Table 3 – Sample distribution by countries 
Country Number of firms % of Total 
Australia 25 5.54% 
Brazil 39 8.65% 
Canada 33 7.32% 
Chile 18 3.,99% 
China 65 14.41% 
France 12 2.66% 
Germany 16 3.55% 
Hong-Kong 10 2.22% 
India 30 6.65% 
Italy 18 3.99% 
Japan 11 2.44% 
Russia 79 17.52% 
Switzerland 12 2.66% 
United Kingdom 15 3.33% 
United States 68 15.08% 
Total 451 100.00% 
 
Table 4 – Sample distribution by industry categories 
Category/Sector Number of firms % of Total 
Energy (in general) 293 64.97% 
Nuclear energy 39 8.65% 
Renewable energy 119 26.39% 




3.2. Measuring the effects 
With the purpose of measuring information transfers caused by the Fukushima 
earthquake, the methodology that has been applied consists in a computation of 
market-adjusted abnormal returns (Alves, Pope & Young, 2009; Alves, Pope & 
Young, 2010), for each one of the companies included in the sample. This metric 
will be used to capture the stock markets effects across the sample, in the days 
following the earthquake. The computation of this methodology will be 
presented having two variants, with the only difference between the two 
approaches being precisely the way how the market-return variable was 
constructed and calculated. As it will be possible to see further on, some slight 
differences will stand out from the results of these two approaches, even 
though there won’t be any relevant improvements from one to another, in 
regard to statistical significance. 
The first approach (as it will be shown on chapter 4.1), makes use of Formula 1 
and Formula 3, while the second one (chapter 4.2) will capture the reaction 
effects by computing the market returns from Formula 2 and then the abnormal 
returns from Formula 3. 
 
Formula 1 (Market-return computed from the sample data): 
 
RM = Value-weighted market return in country k 
R = Datastream return for firm j, on day t 






Formula 2 (Market-return from stock indices): 
 
RM = Market return for firm j, in country k, on day t 
SMIct = Stock Market Index for country c, on day t 
SMIct-1 = Stock Market Index for country c, on day t-1 
 
Formula 3 (Abnormal returns): 
 
AR = Daily abnormal return for firm i, from country k, on day t 
R = Datastream return for firm i, on day t 




4.1. Computing the market return from the sample data 
By selecting this first approach, where the market return formula construction 
for each country is computed directly from the sample data that has been 
gathered for this study, there’s a plausible possibility that some of the market 
returns fail at the task of mirroring the true magnitude of the impacts caused by 
the earthquake event, in every country being analyzed. Naturally, the risk for 
this to happen will be higher as the number of firms in a certain country 
decreases and the bigger that market ends up being. 
Nonetheless, not only this has been an approach that was successfully used in 
prior researches (Han and Wild, 1990; Firth, 1996; Thomas and Zhang, 2006), 
but also and in a certain extent, it ends up granting an advantage in terms of 
filtering the data being analyzed, into firms that come exclusively from the 
relevant industry categories picked up for this study. 
 











In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
Table 5 refers to the abnormal returns reactions when resorting to the sample 
for computing the market-return variable. Panel A reports the whole sample 
analysis and it is actually one of the few items for which it is possible to verify a 
strong statistical significance. Findings don’t indicate any particular big reaction 
effect when looking into this single group, which indeed gathers the whole 
sample of companies collected for this study. However, it’s not like it would be 
expected for it to have any outstanding positive or negative impact. 
Panel B exhibits the abnormal returns results, through a breakdown view by 
sector. The only industry groups where data has been statistically significant 
were the “Energy (in general)” and “Renewable energy” sectors, even though 
that only happened for some of the days being analyzed. There seems to be a 
slight positive impact in the “Energy (in general)” sector (“Day 0 +3”, mean: 
0.98%; median: 0.63%), but it’s within the “Renewable Energy” group that 
results appear to be more expressive, at least when looking into a couple of the 














Table 6 brings the scope into a country-by-country analysis. In the absence of 
the need for any sort of statistical tests for this table in particular, it becomes 
easier to outline a few cases that stand out at a first glance. In Germany for 
example, there’s a notorious positive impact that leads to a +10.60% mean and 
+7.42% median, at the end of Day 5. There is indeed a slight predominance of 
“Renewable Energy” companies within the Germany sample (7 out of 16), but 
this fact single-handedly doesn’t seem to be enough to help explaining such a 
high and positive effect into the abnormal returns. What seems clear though, is 
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that the German energy companies picked in this sample benefited in a large 
scale from the Tohoku earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011. 
Unsurprisingly, Japan is another country for which the data differs from the 
general pattern. This particular case will be discussed and reviewed further on, 
due to the specificities coming from the fact that the earthquake took place 
precisely in a Japanese region. 
 








In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
The table above illustrates the impact on the abnormal returns in Japan, from a 
sectoral point of view. However, this country’s small sample led to a low 
statistical significance on most of the results, which don’t allow to shed much 
light on any assertive conclusion. As it is shown above, the only two sectors that 
comprise Japanese companies (“Energy in general” and “Nuclear energy”) have 
in fact shown signs of a big and positive reaction. Even though there are no 
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renewable energy companies listed in the Japanese sample, the overall impact 
has clearly been positive and it began to be felt on the first working day 
following the earthquake (Day 0, +1). 
Apparently, there is no remarkable difference standing out from the results 
when looking strictly at the two sectors being affected, despite the presence of 
the Tokyo Electric Power company in the Nuclear energy group and its 
prominent negative impact during the days after the earthquake. 
 





In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
It’s important to start by noting that the United Kingdom sample doesn’t 
contain any company belonging to the “Nuclear Energy” group. As for the 
statistical significance on the results obtained from Table 8, it remains difficult 
to draw many conclusions due to the weakness of the tests outcomes, 
particularly in “Day 0” and “Day 0, +5”. There are some indications of a slight 
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positive impact among companies from the “Renewable Energy” sector, even 
though they drop substantially at the last day of the analysis. The “Energy in 
general” group appears to reveal a very similar pattern, whereas the positive 
impact felt during the first days also ended up being offsetted on “Day 0, +5”. 
 






In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
Table 9 reports the United States results, precisely the second country with the 
highest amount of companies comprised in the sample (the first one is Russia, 
with 79). The pooled results seen on Panel A indicate a strong statistical 
significance particularly for the median tests (t-tests), even though it only 
happens after the first Monday (Day 0, +1) that followed the earthquake event. 
As for Panel B, the “Energy in general” group presents a similar behavior to 
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Panel A in terms of statistical significance, with the advantage of extending it to 
the medians (Wilcoxon tests). 
The overall impact in the United States ends up being positive, which is 
understandable since the “Nuclear Energy” group (direct and indirect) 
represents 25% of the country’s sample and it’s the only one reporting a 
negative reaction to the event on “Day 0, +5”. The “Renewable Energy” sector 
stands out with a 3.75% positive variation (median) on the last day of the 
analysis, but since the results only revealed statistical significance at a 10% 
level, any inference must be taken with increased caution. 
 
4.2. Using countries stock indices as the market return 
In an attempt of assessing the impact this earthquake has produced with a 
wider proxy of what the market returns really were, the second approach 
consists on a more direct approach. Instead of computing the “RM” variable 
using “Formula 1” as it has been done in the previous chapter, country stock 
indices were now used to provide a more realistic and broad measure of the 
market returns for each country (“Formula 2”). 
Since this study’s sample comprises companies exclusively linked with the 
energy sector, by going forward with this approach the “market return” 
variable will actually mirror how each of these economies reacted to the 
Tohoku earthquake event, in a more prudent and extensive way. Therefore, the 
computation of the “RM” variable won’t confine merely to the energy sector, 
which in return provides this study with another complementary approach to 











In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
Table 10 presents results for the abnormal returns grouped into a single set 
(Panel A) and by sector (Panel B). There was almost no statistical significance 
found in Panel A, as well as in the “Energy (in general)” and “Nuclear energy 
(direct)” sectors. In the other hand, the “Nuclear Energy (indirect)” and 
“Renewable energy” groups indicate a strong statistical relevancy, especially 
across the last two days of the analysis. Results also denote a positive impact at 
the “green energy” companies (3.52% mean, at the end of “Day 0, +5”), while 
the “Nuclear energy (indirect)” sector got affected negatively, decreasing 2.65% 













Results shown on Table 11 refer to an analysis where data has been grouped on 
a country-by-country basis, and where there was no need to run any t-tests or 
Wilcoxon tests. Similarly to what had already happened when recurring to the 
first approach (Table 6), the positive impact within the Germany sample seems 
to have been the strongest across the 15 countries, with a 12.98% mean and 
9.48% median at the end of “Day 5”. A possible explanation for this evidence 
has already been advanced when discussing the results on Table 6, since 
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Germany’s sample comprises an unusual high amount of “Renewable Energy” 
companies (43.75%). 
In the other hand, Japan’s results exhibit a positive but significantly lower 
impact, when compared to Table 6. At the end of Day 5, the mean is now at 
6.11% and the median at 4.31%, opposed to the respective 8.43% and 13.75% 
registered when applying the previous methodology. Given the fact that the 
Japanese economy as a whole was by far the most affected one when parsing 
data on a country level, it probably becomes easier to understand that when the 
MR variable is computed from the market stock index (as it was done on this 
approach), the abnormal results will also display a less prominent effect. 
 





In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
Table 12 lacks sufficient statistical significance to make any meaningful 
statement. The two sectors that contained any data (“Energy in general” and 
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“Nuclear energy (direct)”), seem to have reacted positively to the earthquake 
event, with its effects starting to be noted right on Day 0. In this particular case, 
having set the “MR” variable to be dependent on the whole Japanese market 
fluctuations, has led to a smaller impact when comparing the results with the 
ones drawn from Table 7. 
Having in mind the big magnitude of the negative impact caused into the 
Tokyo Electric Power company, as well as its own weight in terms of market-
value share within the 11 companies that form the Japanese sample (roughly 
30% on Day 0), it becomes easier to understand that switching the “MR” 
variable for a wider market proxy (the whole Japanese market), somehow 
allows for the effect to be diluted and for the abnormal returns to denote a 
smaller impact. 
 





In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
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From the 15 companies forming the U.K. sample detailed in Table 13, there 
wasn’t a single one belonging to the “Nuclear Energy” sector. There are signs of 
a minimal statistical significance across the 6 days of the analysis with the 
exception of “Day 0”, where not only the impact has been scarce but also the “t-
tests” and “Wilcoxon tests” showed no evidence that the results were 
statistically relevant. Unsurprisingly, the grouped data displayed in Panel A 
presents the highest records of statistical significance from this table, with 
significance levels always marking either 0.05 or 0.01. 
The impact on both panels has been positive, even though it happened in a 
slightly more pronounced manner across the “Renewable Energy” sector (3.34% 
mean and 3.72% median at the end of “Day 5”). 
 









In order to verify the existence of statistical significance in the above results, we conducted one-sample t-
tests (at the means) and Wilcoxon test (at the medians). Superscripts a, b and c report precisely the 
presence of statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Both the "one sample t-tests" as 
well as the "Wilcoxon tests" assumed µ=0, as the population mean value. All the "one sample t-tests" report 
to a two-tailed analysis. 
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Even though the U.S. sample is composed by a reasonably big amount of 
companies, it has been hard to retrieve much statistical significance once again, 
especially for the “Renewable Energy” sector. The Panel A exhibits the U.S. 
grouped data and it indicates a small negative impact at the end of “Day 5” 
(mean is at -1.44% and median at -0.91), a similar trend to the one also 
registered amongst the “Energy (in general)”, and the two Nuclear sectors. 
The effects have been more noticeable within the “Nuclear Energy” sectors, 
with a special incidence on the segment for which these companies have 
activities directly related with nuclear energy production. It was possible to 
obtain good signs of statistical significance for these two groups, especially 
across the two last days of the analysis, which was precisely the period where 
results for both sectors were more pronounced. 
 
4.3. Overview Analysis 
As it was pointed out before, two different approaches were used to measure 
the Tohoku earthquake impact, which resorted to abnormal returns calculations 
on companies involved in activities within the energy sector. It’s important to 
note that these approaches only differ in the way how the market-return 
variable has been calculated. Hence, what actually sets them apart is that the 
first approach consists in somehow isolating the sample and computing the 
market-return variable strictly from the weighted data at disposal. Results 
obtained from this approach are exhibited from Table 5 to Table 9. 
As for the second approach, it made use of several sock indices across the 
world, in order to come up with representative market-return values for each of 
the countries under analysis. This approach brings to light a wider spectrum of 




Table 15 – Significance tests results; break-down by tables and approaches 
Approaches, Tables α = [0.01; 0.05; 0.1] α = 0.01 
Approach 1  
Table 5 31 14 
Table 7 18 4 
Table 8 25 10 
Table 9 19 14 
TOTAL 93 42 
Approach 2  
Table 11 28 16 
Table 13 11 4 
Table 14 25 8 
Table 15 30 18 
TOTAL 94 46 
 
Table 15 summarizes how each of these approaches responded in respect to the 
statistical significance tests. The data reported above suggests that none of the 
approaches proved to be more pronouncedly favorable towards the other, at 
least when judging strictly from the statistical point of view (93 vs 94; 42 vs 46). 
The results presented in the first column (α = *0.01; 0.05; 0.1]) account for the 
number of occurrences where data was found to be statistical significant for at 
least a 10% level of statistical significance. As for the second column (α = 0.01), it 
reports exclusively for the stronger statistical significant cases, since it only 
accounts for situations where a statistical significance level of 1% (superscript 
“a”) was obtained. 
With statistical evidence unable to give any striking advantage from one 
approach over the other, any inferences and conclusions drawn from the results 
must be taken prudently. Nevertheless, looking at Tables 5 and 10, which 
account for the whole pooled sample as well as for the overall results grouped 
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by sector, puts into evidence that there was a moderated impact in the main 
sectors under analysis. 
On the last day of the period being studied (Day 0, +5), precisely the occasion 
where the abnormal returns are expected to have more pronounced results, it’s 
easily observable that there was a positive impact on the “Renewable Energy” 
sector, regardless of the approach undertaken. Hence, and focusing on this 
particular day, statistical significance was clearly stronger on Table 10, as well 
as the magnitude of the abnormal returns reaction in both metrics (median and 
mean). A similar situation happened with the “Nuclear Energy” sector, with 
results being more expressive when the second approach was in place (Table 
10). In this group, statistical significance was only to be found within the 
indirect nuclear energy production subsample, and only across the results 
obtained in Table 10. The impact shown on Table 5 was very small, with almost 
no signs of any statistical significance whatsoever not only on Day 5, but also 
across the entire period. 
The largest grouped data is by far the “Energy (in general)” subsample, which 
comprises 293 companies out of a total of 451 (64.97%). In this group and as it 
been pointed out previously, it is possible to find energy producing companies 
with no signs of a prominent activity in either nuclear or renewable sources. 
Final results (on Day 0, +5) for this group ended up differing substantially when 
looking at Tables 5 and 10, with a slightly positive impact on the first (1.00% 
mean and 0.99% median), while the second approach denoted a minor effect, 
but in the opposite direction (-0.22% mean and -0.39% median). Table 5 was the 
only one reporting evidence for the existence of statistical significance on that 
final day, even though its results across the six days under analysis registered 




Finally and without much surprise, the complete pooled sample group (Panel 
A) drawn from both Tables 5 and 10 indicate a very similar trend to what was 
already observed in the “Energy (in general)” group. Once again and focusing 
on the last day of the analysis, the first approach indicates a positive reaction on 
the mean and median metrics (1.27% and 0.90% respectively), while Table 10 
results show a positive mean (0.52%) and a negative median (-0.18%). Statistical 
significance was also only obtained on the results from Table 5, but any possible 
conclusions from the effects produced at the whole sample, are naturally of less 
interest for this study than the ones inferred from each of the sub sample 
groups. 
 
4.4. The Japanese case 
There are a few interesting particularities regarding the effects produced by the 
2011 Earthquake across the Japanese nuclear energy companies. As expected, 
the company the most affected was the Tokyo Electric Power group, owner of 
the problematic “Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant”. However, and in a 
smaller extent, the Tohoku Electric Power company has also suffered a direct 
hit from this disaster, as one of its nuclear power plants got severely damaged 
(the “Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant”), which led to a significant decrease on the 
company’s capability to serve energy. Apart from these two groups, the 
remaining nine energy companies from the Japanese sample didn’t suffer any 
direct noteworthy wreckage, which means their power plants and energy 
sources didn’t get affected in terms of their maximum generation capacity to 
serve the energy demand. 
That’s precisely one of the key points to understand how the Japanese energy 
market reacted in the days following the Earthquake event. Nowadays, 
available technologies to store energy still have considerable limitations, 
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especially when it comes to nuclear sources. These accounted for roughly 30% 
of Japan’s energy supply before the March 2011 disaster, but that was a scenario 
on the verge of changing considerably over the days following the earthquake. 
As seen previously, Table 1 highlights the window of time between the exact 
moment of the earthquake and the stock markets closing time, for each of the 
main countries belonging to this study’s sample. In the Japanese case, there 
were only 14 minutes setting apart the earthquake event and the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange closure on Friday, but even with such a narrow window of time, the 
index still suffered a small fall, as it dropped 1.65% at the end of that day. It 
would be only on Monday though, that the markets really started getting 
shaken from the earthquake’s massive consequences. 
Heavy selling was expected in Japan in the following days to the disaster and 
that’s exactly what happened as the week unfolded. On Monday (Day 0, +1), 
roughly 4.88 billion shares were traded, a record-breaking figure at the time, 
only matched with the World War 2 hectic times. The energy sector has 
naturally been one of the main targets for investors and while both the Tohoku 
and Tokyo Electric Power companies saw their shares plunging abruptly, most 
of the remaining energy groups seem to have benefited considerably from this 
earthquake event. Table 16 displayed below reports to a closer look at the 
abnormal returns across the Japanese sample, even though it resorts exclusively 
to the second approach that we’ve previously presented and discussed (on 
chapter 4.2). This has to do with the fact that it does grant a more reliable 
measure for assessing the impact from a whole market-level spectrum and it’s 
















Sector 10: Nuclear energy companies 
Sector 8: General energy companies 
On the first Monday following the disaster (Day 0, +1), there was a clear pattern 
standing out on Table 1, as the Tohoku and Tokyo Electric Power companies 
jumped into a freefall scenario (with abnormal returns at -11.29% and -49.22% 
respectively), while the remaining energy companies seem to have gone in a 
total different direction. The Tokyo Stock Exchange was heavily hit that day, 
falling 7.49% at the market closure, in a sort of anticipation of the turmoil that 
would continue devastating the stock markets over the following days. 
What’s interesting to note in the Japanese market, is that regardless of the 
energy companies being primarily of nuclear, renewable or mixed sources, the 
trend of the impact appears to have been quite different from what happened in 
the other countries. With Japan’s energy supply capacities decreasing 
significantly, essentially due to the damage caused at the “Fukushima Daiichi” 
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and “Tohoku” power plants, there was a gap needing to be filled in order to 
respond to the expected demand for energy. With that in mind, but also 
knowing that most of the nuclear energy being produced in those power plants 
couldn’t be technically be stocked, it becomes easier to understand why all the 
other nine energy companies from the Japanese sample recorded positive 
abnormal returns during the entire period being analyzed, regardless of its 
energy sector. This was a pattern different from what has been observed and 
discussed previously when analyzing Table 10, but finds its reasoning on the 
fact that the non-directly affected energy companies (perceived as competitors) 
in Japan, ended up seizing this opportunity to gain more market share and with 





The results drawn from the multiple tables displayed in this study have 
unfortunately led to very weak statistical significance tests, regardless of the 
approaches undertaken. With that in mind, any conclusions extrapolated from 
the results had to be necessarily taken with extra caution and prudence. 
Tables 5 and 10 report to the most relevant findings we had proposed to study 
in this work, since they present all the gathered data, grouped by the main 
energy sectors under analysis (which can be seen in both Panels B). Both tables 
show similar patterns, especially when the focus is set at the “Nuclear Energy” 
and “Renewable Energy” sectors. As expected, results appear to indicate that the 
Fukushima earthquake and the nuclear accidents that followed it, have indeed 
led to a negative impact within companies on which energy sources are 
primarily coming from nuclear production, and in the other hand, companies 
more dependent on renewable energy sources seem to have benefited 
marginally from this series of events triggered by the Japanese earthquake. 
As denoted previously, this overall impact was significantly bigger when using 
the second approach, which also goes in line with what was expected prior to 
this work. Computing the MR variable from a clearly wider market pool, as it 
has been done by picking major national stock indices, instead of relying strictly 
in our sample data to calculate weighted average returns for each country (first 
approach), ended up producing greater effects in the abnormal returns that 
were obtained across most of the tables presented in this study. 
Findings coming from the two tables that were built on a country-level basis 
(Table 6 and Table 11) were never intended to be of extreme relevance or even 
to be analyzed scrupulously in this study, simply because results might be 
deceptive due to the offset effect coming from the nature of the energy 
companies gathered for each country subsample. An extreme example could 
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come from a country having 10 nuclear and 10 renewable energy companies, 
where the two groups would produce opposite effects and actually offset each 
other. Nevertheless and with a few exceptions, there seems to have been a 
general trend for a positive effect across the countries sample, most likely due 
to the fact that only 8.65% of our global sample is formed by “Nuclear energy” 
companies (39 out of 451), precisely the group more prone to react negatively to 
the events under the scope. 
As for Japan, results have shown us that its energy market reacted in a very 
unique way, regardless of the energy source of the companies. Apart from the 
two nuclear energy companies that were strongly hit by the earthquake effects 
(the Tokyo and Tohoku electric power companies), the remaining nine recorded 
a positive boost in their abnormal returns results. The plausible explanation for 
this phenomenon is that there was a sudden demand outbreak for energy in 
Japan, caused by a significant decrease in the supply capabilities from the two 
most affected companies. This gap was immediately filled in the short term by 
the other Japanese energy companies. 
Whether or not it might be possible to seize future opportunities to earn money 
in stock markets from similar situations involving a natural disaster that ends 
up causing serious problems within nuclear energy companies facilities and 
power plants, remains a dubious question. The time window to take actions 
might not be very large and as seen in the timeline presented in the beginning 
of this study, there is always a series of events from political, social and 
economical nature that can hugely affect the way things unfold over the 
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